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Abstract:
Based on a serial supply chain model with 2-periods and price-sensitive demand, we present the first 
experimental test of the effect of strategic inventories on supply chain performance. In theory, if holding costs 
are low enough, the buyer builds up a strategic inventory (even if no operational reasons for stock-holding exist) 
to limit the supplier’s market power, to increase the own profit share, and to enhance the overall supply chain 
performance. The supplier anticipates the effect of the strategic inventory and differentiates prices to capture a 
part of the increased supply chain profits. Our results show that the positive effects of strategic inventories are 
even more pronounced than theoretically predicted, because strategic inventories empower buyers to reduce 
payoff inequalities and suppliers exhibit a willingness to reduce inequalities as long as their payoff remains 
above a certain threshold. Overall, strategic inventories have a double positive effect, a strategic and a behavioral, 
both reducing the average wholesale prices and damping the double marginalization effect and the latter leading 
to more equitable payoffs. 
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1. Introduction
Non-cooperative play in supply chains is known to be a major source of inefficiencies, because the 
incentives of the supply chain parties are typically not aligned, leading to individually optimal 
decisions that harm the overall supply chain performance. A recently emerging strand of research on 
the effects of non-cooperative optimization in supply chains is concerned with the effects of multi-
period interaction. One of the surprising findings in this literature is that the strategic interaction across 
periods can be advantageous to the overall supply chain performance. More specifically, Anand, 
Anupindi, and Bassok (2008) show that inefficiency is reduced in a multi-period supply chain, because 
buyers build up a strategic inventory solely to offset the strategic advantage that a monopoly supplier 
otherwise has. Although the strategic inventory is created by the buyer to increase the own payoff 
share, it also benefits the supplier, because the overall performance of the supply chain is enhanced, by 
partly reducing the suppliers monopoly power and, thus, the degree of double marginalization.1
Since most supply chain interactions in reality take place in multi-period settings, the efficiency 
enhancement due to strategic inventories may be good news for the economy. For the phenomenon to 
be effective, however, the players are required to demonstrate a high degree of strategic sophistication 
in their behavior. Given the extensive literature on behavioral biases in single period supply chain 
interactions, it is not self-evident that theoretically predicted efficiency gains are behaviorally 
sustained in this type of multi-period interplay. Especially the frequently observed failure to identify 
profit maximizing order quantities or wholesale prices (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Katok and Wu, 
2009) and the tendency to consider fairness consequences of supply chain decisions (Cui et al., 2007; 
Loch and Wu, 2008; Pavlov and Katok, 2011) may behaviorally interfere with the theoretical 
predictions. 
In this study, we present a laboratory experiment that allows us to test for the empirical relevance of 
the concept of strategic inventories. We find overwhelmingly clear evidence for the behavioral 
relevance of strategic inventories and the efficiency enhancing effect that they have on the overall 
supply chain performance. Using a control treatment, in which strategic inventories are out of 
equilibrium, we demonstrate that our subjects (management and economics undergraduates) use the 
inventories in a strategically sophisticated manner and not just because they are given the opportunity 
to do so. 
1 Intuitively, strategic inventory in a multi-period supply chain game reduces the monopoly power of a supplier, 
because the inventory acts as a “virtual competitor” and leads to a reduced equilibrium wholesale price, which in 
turn allows the buyer to reduce the market price and serve a larger number of consumers.  
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The strong evidence that we find for the behavioral relevance of strategic inventories is surprising, 
given the interplay between strategic behavior and strategic uncertainty, which is inherent to this 
multi-period interaction. In equilibrium, both the supplier’s wholesale price and the buyer’s order 
quantity in the first period are greater than in the case without strategic inventories (Anand et al., 
2008). Increasing both the price and the quantity, not only requires a clear understanding of the 
strategic situation on the side of both parties, but also a mutual trust in each others’ strategic 
sophistication. The supplier faces the coordination risk that the buyer may fail to build up a 
sufficiently large strategic inventory to support the equilibrium, while the buyer faces the coordination 
risk that the supplier may fail to decrease the second period’s wholesale price sufficiently to 
compensate the buyer for the higher first period price and the occurring holding cost. Hence, for the 
equilibrium to be behaviorally relevant, both suppliers and buyers must trust that the other party 
deliberates with a high degree of strategic sophistication and plays the equilibrium strategy. A 
substantial part of the literature on behavior in supply chains, however, shows that players may fail to 
optimize or fail to believe that their counterparts optimize (e.g. Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Wu and 
Katok, 2009; Özer et al., 2011; Croson et al., 2012). In contrast to the persistent out of equilibrium 
behavior found in that literature, we observe a high degree of behavioral stability very close to the 
equilibrium. Hence, our results indicate that strategic inventories are a robust phenomenon of supply 
chain interaction, as long as holding costs are not prohibitively high. 
While we observe that the strategic inventories are adopted whenever predicted by theory, they are 
significantly smaller than in equilibrium. By choosing smaller inventories the buyer can establish a 
more equitable distribution of the profits. We define buyer empowerment to be the possibility to 
reduce the inequity of the payoff distribution via inventory choices. We show that the suppliers facing 
empowered buyers are willing to reduce average wholesale prices as long as they can keep their profits 
above a certain threshold. 
The situation in the field is obviously much richer than in our lab and it may be complicated by 
numerous effects that we have controlled for in the experiment. Yet, our experiment does provide 
evidence that strategic inventories provide an endogenous mean(s) for the contract partners to flexibly 
allocate profits within the supply chain. We observe that the supplier uses this additional flexibility to 
show kindness by reducing average wholesale prices to some extent and the buyer reduces the 
inequality of payoffs by choosing an inventory smaller than in the game theoretic equilibrium. This 
behavioral effect leads to a supply chain performance that is even more enhanced than in the game 
theoretic prediction by Anand et al. (2008). 
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2. Literature Review 
Our experimental study is based on the theoretical model by Anand et al. (2008), in which they 
consider the interaction in a serial supply chain with a deterministic, price-sensitive demand. The 
buyer (female pronouns) in the supply chain, has a downstream retail monopoly, but must rely on the 
supply chain supplier (male pronouns) as the only source for the retailed good (i.e. the supplier has an 
upstream monopoly). Anand et al. (2008) extend this classical setting introduced by Spengler (1950) 
by allowing the buyer to build up an inventory that she can use to serve part of her future demand. 
Thus, the buyer’s strategic inventory reduces the supplier’s monopoly power and leads to a reduction 
of the wholesale price. However, anticipating the buyer’s inventory buildup, the supplier differentiates 
prices across periods, setting a higher wholesale price in the first and a lower wholesale price in the 
second period. The sales expanding effect of the strategic inventory works in favor of both buyer and 
supplier, but the buyer only achieves additional payoffs for sufficiently low holding cost. Due to the 
additional holding cost and due to some degree of double marginalization that persists, the supply 
chain optimum in the 2-period game cannot be achieved in equilibrium.2
Our paper contributes to the literature on the effects of strategic decision making in inter-temporal 
supply chains, by examining the behavioral validity and reliability of the game theoretic predictions. A 
rather large body of literature on the behavioral aspects of the newsvendor’s problem and the bull-
whip effect has emerged, demonstrating the contribution of experimental research to a better 
understanding of strategic interaction in supply chains. The main findings of this literature can be 
summarized in several behavioral phenomena, each interfering in a different manner with the game 
theoretic predictions. In the following, we briefly summarize the observed behavioral phenomena and 
relate them to our study.  
One frequently observed behavioral phenomenon is the failure of supply chain players to choose profit 
maximizing order quantities (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Katok and Wu, 2009). In their seminal 
paper, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), for example, study the ordering behavior of buyers in a 
newsvendor setting under stochastic demand without price-sensitivity. They observe that buyers fail to 
optimize, but tend to place orders that lie between the average demand and the optimal quantity. They 
show that the observed “pull-to-center effect” cannot be explained by risk preferences, loss aversion, 
2 It is worth noting that Anand et al. (2008) show that a two-part tariff in this setting does not necessarily 
coordinate the supply chain efficiently, because the buyer may have an incentive to build up inventory today to 
save the fixed fee tomorrow. As a reaction the supplier will no longer use his marginal production costs for the 
per unit payment to maintain his profit. This highlights the fact that strategic considerations in inter-temporal 
decision making can affect the outcome of contracting mechanism in both towards and away from the efficient 
solution. 
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or prospect theory. They conclude that the observed behavior may be due to an effort to minimize the 
ex-post inventory error (orders are positively correlated with past demand) or due to anchoring and an 
insufficient adjustment heuristic (orders move towards optimal value over time). In a careful and 
extended experimental reassessment of the newsvendor problem, Katok and Wu (2009) can confirm 
the pull-to-center effect and the buyer’s inventory error minimization behavior. They additionally 
show that while both buy-back and revenue sharing contracts can improve the supply chain efficiency, 
neither leads to a stable optimal behavior. Although our setting is obviously different from the 
newsvendor game with demand uncertainty, generalizing the observed behavioral phenomenon, we 
can conjecture that both our suppliers and our buyers will make decisions that are insufficiently 
adjusted to the optimal strategic play. 
Another frequently observed behavioral phenomenon is a concern for fairness and reciprocity. The 
notion that fairness generally plays an important role in human interaction has been common 
knowledge in social sciences for centuries. But, an elaborate research of the concept and its 
consequences for economic performance only started after a series of early economic experiments (e.g. 
Güth et al., 1982; Forsythe et al. 1994; Berg and Dickhaut, 1995; Bolton, 1991; Fehr et al. 1998) had 
documented that concerns for fairness persistently affect economic behavior. The research has 
culminated in a number of theoretical papers modeling different facets of fairness, including a 
preference for equity in income distribution (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), a 
preference for reciprocal responses to acts of intentional kindness and spite (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004), a preference for increasing mutual benefits, or any combination of the 
preferences listed above (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). 
While it is rather difficult to clearly separate the different facets of fairness preferences in supply chain 
settings, it is important to note that in most cases all facets of the concern for fairness will have the 
same type of impact on behavior. Such concerns generally drive the wholesale prices down (and 
sometimes the ordered quantities up) leading to a decrease in the payoff differences in the supply 
chain (Cui et al., 2007; Pavlov and Katok, 2011). As Loch and Wu (2008) show in their experimental 
study of supply chains with wholesale price contracts under deterministic, price sensitive demand, the 
profits in all treatments are more evenly distributed than predicted by standard theory, because the 
suppliers set lower wholesale prices than predicted. Additionally, if an inter-personal tie has been 
created between the supplier and the buyer, the buyer tends to increase sales boosting the overall 
efficiency gains. In another experimental study, Keser and Paleologo (2004) examine the behavior of 
supply chain members in a newsvendor setting under a wholesale price contract. They observe a 
tendency towards an equitable distribution of profits. As the buyers tend to terminate games with high 
wholesale prices, suppliers seem to voluntarily choose lower wholesale prices that split the profits 
approximately equal. Our paper contributes to this literature by studying the influence of other 
regarding preferences in the context of 2-period supply chain interaction with strategic inventories. 
Another behavioral phenomenon observed by Croson et al. (2012) in a laboratory study of the beer 
game is that coordination risk is a driving force in supply chain interaction. According to their 
definition, a coordination risk exists if individuals make independent decisions and if the “decision 
makers have limited knowledge of, or trust in, their partner’s motives or cognitive abilities.” As a 
result, individuals may consider the effects of a deviation from the equilibrium solution and decide to 
hedge themselves against an out of equilibrium decision of their supply chain partner. For example, 
Croson et al. (2012) observe that subjects deviate from the theoretically optimal behavior by building 
up a coordination stock to hedge against the possibility that their partners might not behave optimally 
(e.g. order too much). In our setting, the supplier faces a coordination risk because his profits drop, if 
he decides to raise the first period’s wholesale price, but the buyer fails to build up strategic inventory. 
The buyer also faces a coordination risk, because the supplier might fail to lower the second period’s 
wholesale price sufficiently to compensate the buyer for the cost of her strategic inventory. 
3. The Model 
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1,2
The model of strategic inventories, introduced by Anand et al. (2008), is a 2-period game with two 
players, a supplier and a buyer. At the beginning of each period ( t  ), the supplier determines a 
wholesale price (w ) and posts it to the buyer. The buyer then chooses her purchase quantity (Q ) and 
the quantity of units that she supplies to an external market (q ). The sales price ( ) in the external 
market is determined by the linear inverse demand function
t t
t tp
 t qt a b tp q    . If the quantity that the 
buyer has purchased in the first period is larger than the quantity sold in the first period (i.e. if Q ),
then she builds up inventory ( I Q ) to be sold in the second period. The inventory reduces the 
second period purchase quantity that is required to optimize her profit (
1 1q
1q 1
2q Q2 I 

). To focus only on 
the strategic effects of building up inventory, we follow Anand et al. (2008) and deliberately leave out 
all other mechanisms (e.g. operational or supply and demand risks) that may motivate inventories. 
The buyer faces holding cost h for each stored unit. At the end of period two, unsold units have a 
salvage value of zero. Both supplier and buyer have perfect information. The profit function of the 
supplier under zero production cost is 
 
  
   	 
  	 	
1 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 ,
,S
I
w w w Q w Q
w q w q I
 (1) 
and the profit function of the buyer is given by 
     
       
       	   
      	   	      
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
, ,
.
B q I q p q q w Q h I p q q w Q
a b q q w q I h I a b q q w q I
 (2) 
In an integrated supply chain, the wholesale prices only define the transfer payments between the 
supplier and the buyer and are, therefore, not relevant for optimizing the overall supply chain profit. 
Furthermore, since inventories are purely strategic and incur a positive cost, building up inventory is 
not rational when there is no conflict of interest between the two parties. Thus, in an integrated supply 
chain, we only need to choose the optimal sales quantities that maximize the joint profits 
     
    
 
  	 
 	
 
1 2 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
2
.
,SC q q p q q p q q
a b q q a b q q
(3)
As Anand et al. (2008) demonstrate, the optimal quantities for the periods are independent of the 
number of periods and equal to 2btq a  in every period. For a 2-period game, this results in a first-
best total supply chain profit of 2
w ,q I
2SC a b  .
If the supply chain is not integrated, the supplier and the buyer independently choose their decision 
variables (  and ) to optimize their individual profits. As Anand et al. (2008) show, in 
equilibrium, strategic inventory is only built up, if the holding costs are not prohibitively high, i.e. 
I > 0 if 
t t
1
4h
 a
2w w
. We call these cases the dynamic solutions, because the supplier has an incentive to 
choose dynamic prices, i.e. . However, if the holding costs are too high (i.e. if 1
1 a 
2w
4h ), the 
buyer no longer has an incentive to build up a strategic inventory. This leads to constant wholesale 
prices over both periods (i.e. ) and to equilibria that resemble the standard solution of the one 
period setting. We call these cases the static solutions. The closed-form static and dynamic solutions 
can be derived using backward induction as shown by Anand et al. (2008) and described below. 
1w 
At the end of the second period the buyer chooses her selling quantity. The optimal response function 
to the supplier’s wholesale price of the second period is  
   2 2 22max , .a wbq w I   (4) 
The supplier anticipates this reaction by integrating the buyer’s response function into his profit 
function and chooses a wholesale price 
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   2 2max 0, .aIw b I   (5) 
The supplier’s response function shows that by building up an inventory, the buyer can influence the 
equilibrium wholesale price. Anticipating the strategic effect of an inventory, the buyer chooses her 
optimal first period sales 
   1 1 12max 0, a wbq w   (6) 
and inventory 
   1 2 22 3 3max 0, .ab b bI w h w     1  (7) 
Hence, the buyer only builds up inventory, if  
1
3
4 .w h a	 
  (8)
Since a and are constant, the supplier’s choice of the wholesale price determines whether or not the 
buyer build up strategic inventory. Anticipating this, the supplier chooses a wholesale price 
h
 1 9 2, 172max .a a hw   (9) 
Inserting the minimal wholesale price 1 / 2w a  into (8) directly shows that strategic inventory is 
only observed, if 1h a
 4  holds.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the first-best, the static, and the dynamic solutions of the game. Note 
that the total supply chain profit in the static solution corresponds to only 75% of the total supply 
chain profit in first-best solution. In the dynamic solution, the total supply chain profit depends on the 
holding cost, but it will not exceed about 79.8% of the first-best outcome, even if the holding cost are 
zero. The lower supply chain profits in the two non-cooperative settings is obviously due to the double 
marginalization effect that arises, because both supply chain members individually maximize their 
profits, by placing monopoly surcharges on their marginal costs. 
- 7 - 
Table 1: Comparison of Solutions 
first-best
static
1 4h a 
dynamic
1 4h a
  first-best
static
1 4h a 
dynamic
1 4h a
 
wholesale
prices
{ , }1w 2w
- ,2 2
a a 
 
 
9 2 6 10
,
17 17
a h a h 	 
 
 
market
prices
{ 1p , 2p }
,
2 2
a a 
 
 
3 3
,
4 4
a a 
 
 
13 23 10
,
17 34
a h a h 	 
 
 
order
quantities
{ , }1Q 2Q
,
2 2
a a
b b
 
 
 
,
4 4
a a
b b
 
 
 
13 18 3 5
,
34 17
a h a h
b b
 	 
 
 
profit
supplier
S
-
2
4
a
b
2 29 4 8
34
a ah h
b
 	
inventory
I
0 0
 5 4
34
a h
b
 
profit
buyer
B
-
2
8
a
b
2 2155 118 304
1156
a ah h
b
 	
market
quantities
{ , }1q 2q
,
2 2
a a
b b
 
 
 
,
4 4
a a
b b
 
 
 
4 11 10
,
17 34
a h a h
b b
	  
 
 
profit
supply 
chain
SC
2
2
a
b
23
8
a
b
2 2461 254 576
1156
a ah h
b
 	
If the holding costs are sufficiently low and strategic inventories are used (i.e. in the dynamic solution), 
then the first period’s wholesale price is greater and the second period’s wholesale price is smaller 
than in the static solution. The intuition is that the supplier sets a higher price in the first period to 
reduce the buyer’s incentives to build up an inventory. In the second period, the wholesale price is 
lower than in the static solution, because the buyer only needs to satisfy her residual demand, given 
the inventory. Thus, the strategic inventory reduces the monopoly power of the supplier. Nevertheless, 
the comparison also shows that the supplier is always better off in the dynamic solution, because the 
reduced monopoly power leads to price differentiation across periods. These differentiated prices yield 
lower average wholesale prices which reduces the degree of double marginalization. The buyer is also 
better off with a strategic inventory, as long as the holding costs are not too high, i.e. as long as 
21 a152h
  . Her profits in the dynamic solution are only less than those in the static solution, if
21 1
4152 a h a 
 
  .
The overall performance of a non-integrated supply chain in the dynamic solution is superior to the 
performance in a static solution for sufficiently low holding cost ( 55 a288h
  ). For holding cost above 
this threshold, the benefits of the lower wholesale prices (i.e. the benefits from the reduction of the 
double marginalization) are offset by the increase in the total costs of the inventory. The greatest 
improvement in supply chain performance (about 6.34% more than in the static solution) can be 
achieved with a strategic inventory, when the holding cost is zero. Nevertheless, even at zero holding 
cost, the first-best solution cannot be achieved, because the double marginalization effect is only 
diminished, but not fully eliminated. Furthermore, as Anand et al. (2008) show, no dynamic contract 
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exists that can perfectly coordinate the supply chain and allow the supplier to extract all residual 
profits. 
4. Behavioral Hypotheses and Experimental Design 
4.1 Experimental Parameterization and Behavioral Hypotheses 
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42h
Table 2 shows the theoretical predictions for our two experimental treatments. In both treatments, the 
inverse demand function is p q . In the low cost treatment (LC), due to the relatively 
low inventory holding cost ( ), the game theoretic model predicts a dynamic solution, with falling 
wholesale prices, a strategic inventory, and higher payoffs both for the supplier and the buyer, when 
compared to the static solution without strategic inventory. The distribution of supply chain payoffs is 
asymmetric in equilibrium, with about two-thirds going to the supplier and one-third to the buyer. In 
the high cost treatment (HC), the relatively high holding cost (
4h 
 ) prohibits the profitable adoption 
of a strategic inventory, so that the game theoretic model predicts a static solution with constant 
wholesale prices and order quantities. As in the other treatment, the distribution of supply chain 
payoffs is asymmetric in equilibrium, with about two-thirds going to the supplier and one-third to the 
buyer. Hence, while the treatments are very different concerning the strategic situation, they are very 
similar in the distribution of equilibrium payoffs. This similarity is important, because it guarantees 
that differences in the frequency of equilibrium play are not due to the ex ante differences in the 
equilibrium payoff distributions.
Table 2: Theoretical Predictions 
low cost treatment (LC)
4h
high cost treatment (HC)
42h
period 1 period 2 period 1 period 2
*tw 80 56 76 76
tp 116 104 114 114
tq 18 24 19 19
*I 10 0
S 3,024 (66.55%) 2,888 (66.67%)
B 1,520 (33.45%) 1,444 (33.33%)
SC 4,544 4,332
 * decision variables in the experimental analysis 
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The cognitive coordination risk of each player depends on the payoff consequences of boundedly 
rational out-of-equilibrium play by the other player. In HC, the coordination risk is negligible for both 
players. Trivially, the supplier has no coordination risk in period 2, because no further decisions 
follow. Hence, we expect to observe profit maximizing choices. While it seems unlikely that the 
supplier chooses a period 2 wholesale price higher than the optimal one, it is possible that the buyer 
will hedge against a high period 2 wholesale price by increasing inventories. In HC, however, the 
expected price increase must be dramatically high (i.e., the expected second period’s wholesale price 
must be greater than the first period’s wholesale price plus the holding cost) to support such inventory 
decisions. We do not expect to observe this scenario frequently, because it entails high losses both for 
the supplier and the buyer. If the supplier nevertheless assigns a positive probability that the buyer 
hedges against increasing wholesale prices, the first period’s wholesale price will be set higher, but 
never lower than the static solution price, i.e., not below 76. 
Behavioral Hypothesis 1 (“Cognitive coordination risk in HC”):
(1a) In HC, the period 1 price is greater than the static solution price.  
(1b) In HC, strategic inventories are greater than the optimal level, if period 2 wholesale prices are 
sub-optimally high.  
(1c) In HC, the period 2 price is equal to the price of the static solution. 
In LC, the players face substantial cognitive coordination risks in period 1, but – as in HC – not in 
period 2. Hence, we expect the period 2 prices to be optimal. In LC, it might be slightly more likely 
than in HC that we observe hedging against increasing wholesale prices, simply because the cost of 
hedging (holding costs) are lower. However, as the cost effect is still substantial for both the supplier 
and the buyer, we do not expect to observe this behavior frequently. In contrast, if the buyer expects 
sub-optimally low wholesale prices in the second period, then she chooses lower inventories in order 
to stock less in period 1, thereby reducing holding cost, and buying more in period 2. In period 1, if the 
supplier believes that the buyer may choose an inventory that is greater than the equilibrium level, he 
can hedge against the coordination risk by choosing a wholesale price greater than the equilibrium 
price. In contrast, if the supplier believes that the buyer may choose inventory levels smaller than the 
equilibrium level, hedging would entail choosing a price below the price of the dynamic solution, but 
not smaller than the price of the static solution. 
Behavioral Hypothesis 2 (“Cognitive coordination risk in LC”):
(2a) In LC, the period 1 price is greater than or equal to the static solution price.  
(2b) In LC, strategic inventories are greater (smaller) than the optimal level, if period 2 wholesale 
prices to be sub-optimally high (low).  
(2c) In LC, the period 2 price is equal to the optimal price. 
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The behavioral literature provides quite a bit of evidence on the effects of fairness in bilateral 
interactions. In both the LC and HC treatment, a supplier’s concern for fairness leads to the choice of 
lower average wholesale prices. Such a decrease would dampen the effect of double marginalization 
and shift profits from the supplier to the buyer. Note, that shifting payoffs to the buyer generally leads 
to a more equal distribution of profits, since the buyer earns considerably less in both treatments.  
The buyer’s possibility to show a concern for fairness is different in HC than in LC. In LC, a concern 
for fairness translates to lower levels of strategic inventory as long as the buyer’s marginal loss is 
smaller than the supplier’s marginal loss (see appendix B). Going beyond this point would harm the 
buyer more than the supplier and, thus, increase payoff inequality. In contrast to the buyer in LC, we 
do not expect the buyer in HC to be able to reduce payoff inequality by reducing the strategic 
inventory, since she holds no inventory in equilibrium. The expected effects of fairness concerns on 
the interplay in the supply chains are summarized in the hypotheses 3 and 4 below.  
Hypothesis 3 (“Fairness Concerns in HC”):
(3a) In HC, the average wholesale price of both periods is smaller than the equilibrium price.  
(3b) In HC, strategic inventories are equal to the equilibrium level. 
Hypothesis 4 (“Fairness Concerns in LC”):
(4a) In LC, the average wholesale price of both periods is smaller than the equilibrium price.  
(4b) In LC, strategic inventories are smaller than the equilibrium level. 
4.2 Experimental Procedure 
The experiment was conducted at a German University using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
A total of 96 subjects, 24 suppliers and 24 buyers in each of the two treatments, participated in the 
experiment. At the outset of the experiment, each subject was randomly assigned either the role of a 
supplier or of a buyer. Subjects maintained their roles throughout the 15 decision rounds. Hence, a 
total of 360 games were played per treatment. The subjects were divided into matching groups of three 
suppliers and three buyers and randomly re-matched within their matching groups in every decision 
round to avoid reputation (i.e. repeated game) effects. As each matching group forms an independent 
observation, a total of 8 observations per treatment were used for the statistical analysis.  
The instructions were handed out to the subjects upon arrival and were read aloud. Then, after a short 
individual re-reading time, the subjects had the possibility to ask questions that were answered 
privately. Communication between the subjects was prohibited. Before the game started, the subjects 
were given a computerized comprehension quiz to ensure that they had fully understood the rules of 
the game. Subjects were paid the sum of their profits in all rounds in cash, immediately after the 
experiment. 
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To reduce the decision load on the subjects and to focus on the role of strategic inventories in supply 
chain interactions, we set the market sales quantities (q ) automatically to the optimal value in 
every period. Hence, the buyer’s decision is limited to her strategic inventory size ( I ) in the first period, 
while the supplier sets his wholesale prices (w ) in periods one and two. Since automating the 
choice of the sales quantities deprives the buyer of the option to punish the supplier by reducing the 
quantity sold to the market, we provide the buyer with the opportunity to terminate the game after 
being informed about the wholesale price of the first period. If this outside option is chosen by the 
buyer, the payoffs of both the buyer and the supplier are set zero and the round ends immediately. The 
course of events of each decision round is displayed in 
1 2
1 2
Figure 1.
Supplier determines  
the wholesale price of period 1 (w )1
Buyer continues the game 
Supplier determines 
the wholesale price of period 2 (w )2
Buyer terminates the game 
P
e
r
i
o
d
2
Buyer determines her inventory size ( I )
P
e
r
i
o
d
1
End of decision round
Figure 1: Sequence of Decisions 
The suppliers choose any wholesale price in the interval between 0 and 152. At the lower price bound 
the supplier earns nothing from selling his units and at the upper price bound buyers have no incentive 
to purchase any goods from the supplier. 
The buyers decide to build up an inventory in the range between 0 and 38 units. The optimal response 
function of the buyer in (7) shows that even if both the wholesale price of the first period and the 
inventory holding cost would be zero, quantities greater than 38 cannot be optimal. Hence, choosing 
values outside of the permitted intervals cannot be reasonable. 
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To further facilitate decision making, the subjects were provided with a profit calculator and a payoff 
table as decision supports. The profit calculator displays the profits of both players for any 
combination of decision variables. The subjects could also use the payoff tables that displayed the 
profits for integer value combinations of the decision variables. The subjects were informed that the 
tables do not contain payoff information for all possible values of the decision parameters and only 
serve as a guide, giving an overview of the payoff space. The instructions also point out that the 
onscreen profit calculator can be used to look up profits for any feasible combination of decision 
parameters. An English translation of the instructions for the treatment with low inventory holding 
cost, including the corresponding payoff table, is contained in appendix A. 
5. Results
Table 3 displays the theoretical predictions of the strategic inventory model next to the observed mean 
and median values of our experiment for both treatments. The values for the individual and supply 
chain profits are shown excluding and including the cases, in which the game was terminated and both 
players earned zero (these values are displayed in the brackets). Since decisions on the inventory size 
and the second period wholesale price are only made when the game is not terminated, only data from 
non-terminated games are contained in these aggregate values. In the low cost treatment (LC), 34 
games of 360 were aborted, i.e. about 9%. The rate of termination in the high cost treatment (HC) was 
only about 4% (14 of 360 games were terminated), i.e. less than half the termination rate in LC. 
Table 3: Theoretical Analysis vs. Experimental Results 
low cost treatment (LC) high cost treatment (HC)
equilibrium median mean equilibrium median mean
period 1 wholesale price 80 70 70.11 76 76 73.91
inventory 10 10 8.98 0 0 1.37
period 2 wholesale price 56 56 58.58 76 76 71.34
profit supplier 3,024
2,888
(2,884)
2,870.40
(2,599.30)
2,888
2,887.75
(2,885.375)
2,848.13
(2,729.46)
profit buyer 1,520
1,759.25
(1,744.63)
1,803.60
(1,633.33)
1,444
1,444
(1,444)
1,533
(1,470.08)
profit supply chain 4,544
4,731.50
(4,686)
4,674
(4,232)
4,332
4,332
(4,332)
4,381
(4,199.54)
The observed mean and median values of the game parameter are extremely close to the equilibrium 
predictions for both treatments. In fact, the empirical medians and the theoretical predictions are 
identical except for the first period wholesale price and the corresponding profits in the LC treatment, 
in which the adoption of strategic inventories was observed to be almost perfectly in the range of 
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values theoretically predicted. In the HC treatment, in which the holding cost is too high to allow for 
the adoption of a strategic inventory, we observe almost no inventories (the median of observed values 
is zero and the mean is just slightly greater than one). Furthermore, we observe a substantial deviation 
between the median first and second period wholesale prices – as predicted – in LC, but no difference 
between the two wholesale prices HC. Overall, it seems that the strategic interaction that is 
incorporated in the game theoretic analysis of the strategic inventory game is an almost perfect 
predictor of observed behavior.  
The only noteworthy deviation of the observed behavior from the game theoretic predictions is 
connected to the more equitable division of supply chain profits in LC, in which a strategic inventory 
is feasible. These observations provide substantial support for our behavioral hypothesis 4 (“Fairness 
Concerns in LC”), but not for any of the other behavioral hypotheses.   
Below, we provide a detailed analysis of the data. The results are presented in four parts: the supplier’s 
decision on the first period wholesale price, the buyer’s decision on the strategic inventory size, the 
supplier’s decision on the second period wholesale price, and finally the resulting individual and 
supply chain profits. The statistical analyses are based on the independent observations (i.e. every 
observation is the median of 45 games). 
5.1 Supplier’s Period 1 Wholesale Price 
Figure 2 displays the development of the median period 1 wholesale prices over the 15 decision 
rounds for both treatments. In both treatments, the median period 1 price starts about 8 or 9 points 
below the theoretical benchmark. While the median in HC quickly moves up to reach the equilibrium 
prediction and stays there by round 4, the observed period 1 prices in LC tend to drop over time, 
moving significantly further away from equilibrium towards the end of the experiment.3 Hence, we 
observe a clear difference between the behavior of the suppliers in HC and LC concerning the period 1 
wholesale prices. 
The observed deviation of wholesale prices from the dynamic solution in LC in line with the concern 
for fairness as in hypothesis 4a that predicts lower than equilibrium wholesale prices may be used to 
reduce the payoff gap between suppliers and buyers. We can reject the hypothesis H2a that the lower 
wholesale prices are due to the suppliers’ perceived cognitive coordination risk, because the lower 
3 Comparing the observed values in the first five to those of the last five rounds using a sign test, the error 
probability is p = 0.063, two-tailed. We also find a significant negative correlation between the period 1 
wholesale prices and the decision round using Spearman’s rank correlation measure (r = -0.188, p < 0.001). 
bound for prices according to that hypothesis is the static outcome price of 76. Observed wholesale 
prices in LC, however, are significantly below 76 (sign test, p=0.008, two-tailed).
Surprisingly, suppliers in HC neither exhibit behavior that indicates cognitive coordination risk nor do 
they show a concern for fairness in the first period. The former (H1a) would lead to wholesale prices 
above equilibrium, while the latter (H3a) would yield wholesale prices below the equilibrium in period 
1. We find no significant difference between the observed period 1 wholesale prices and the static 
solution  price (i.e., 76) and, thus, find no strong support for either of the hypotheses. 
60
65
70
75
80
85
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415
m
ed
ia
n
w
ho
le
sa
le
p
ri
ce
p
er
io
d
1
decisionround
lowcost
bestchoice(LC) observeddata(LC)
60
65
70
75
80
85
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
m
ed
ia
n
w
ho
le
sa
le
p
ri
ce
p
er
io
d
1
decisisonround
highcost
bestchoice(HC) observeddata(HC)
Figure 2: Development of Period 1 Wholesale Prices 
5.2 Buyers’ Strategic Inventory Decision 
We find no significant differences between the observed strategic inventory sizes and the 
corresponding equilibrium predictions in either of the treatments. Note, however, that while the 
equilibrium inventory size happens to be an empirical best response to the observed median period 1 
wholesale prices in HC, it is not an empirical best response to the much lower observed period 1 
wholesale prices in LC. 
Table 4 displays the equilibrium, the empirical best response, and observed strategic inventory sizes 
for both treatments. The buyers’ empirical best response to the suppliers’ period 1 prices in HC are 
very close to the equilibrium prediction. The best response to the median period 1 wholesale price in 
HC is to adopt no strategic inventory (as in equilibrium), and the best response to the average period 1 
wholesale price in HC is to adopt a strategic inventory of size 1. We observe a median inventory size 
of zero and a mean inventory size of 1.37. We find no statistical differences between observed 
inventory sizes and the equilibrium predictions or the empirical best responses (sign test, p = 1, two-
tailed). Hence, we have no strong support for H1b and can conclude that the buyers in HC show no 
tendency to hedge against the suppliers’ out of equilibrium price choices in period 2. Instead, it seems 
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that they make strategic inventory decisions that are almost perfectly in line with the non-cooperative, 
payoff maximizing equilibrium of the game. 
Table 4: Inventory Choices and Best Responses 
treatment equilibrium
empirical best response observed data
to median to mean median mean
LC 10 13.67 13.33 10 8.98
HC 0 0 1 0 1.37
In the LC treatment, the observed inventory size is significantly larger than zero (sign test, p = 0.016, 
two-tailed). Hence, as predicted by theory, inventory is only utilized if the holding cost is sufficiently 
low. However, in contrast to the observation of best response inventory choices in HC, the observed 
inventory choices in LC cannot be considered as best responses to the observed wholesale prices of 
period 1. Figure 3 displays the median best responses and the median observed inventory sizes in LC 
(left panel) and HC (right panel). It is evident that inventory choices are almost perfectly in line with 
best response in HC, but well below the best responses in LC.4 On average, the chosen inventory size 
in LC is about 27 percent smaller than the best response. This difference is significant (sign test, 
p = 0.008, two-tailed). 
The difference between observed and best response inventory sizes in LC may either be due to the 
buyers’ perception of cognitive coordination risk (as in hypothesis H2b) or due to the buyers’ concern 
for fairness (as in hypothesis H4b). Since the observed inventory sizes are smaller than the best 
response, hypothesis H2b can only hold, if we assume that buyers expect the period 2 wholesale prices 
to be sub-optimally low. While we cannot reject this notion formally, our analysis of the period 2 
prices shows (see the next sub-section) that sub-optimally low wholesale prices are hardly observed in 
period 2, i.e. the period 2 prices are not significantly different from the optimal response. Hence, it 
seems unlikely that buyers’ behavior is driven by the perception of cognitive coordination risk. 
In contrast, the hypothesis on the buyers’ concern for fairness in LC (H4b) is supported 
strongly. Figure 3 displays the median of the inventory size choices in LC that would minimize the 
payoff difference between buyers and suppliers (“fair response”). The derivation of the buyer’s fair 
response inventory quantity is given in Appendix B. It seems that instead of choosing profit 
maximizing inventory sizes, buyers are choosing inventory sizes that equalize the profits of both 
supply chain partners as much as possible. As mentioned above, inventory choices in LC are 
4 Note that the observed median inventory size is always either an integer or exactly halfway between two 
integers. This makes the median slightly more volatile than the mean and explains the sudden, substantial drop 
we observe in the inventory size in round 6 of LC.   
significantly smaller than the best responses, but not significantly different from the “fair response 
“ (sign test, p = 1, two-tailed). 
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Figure 3: Development of Inventory Quantities 
5.3 Supplier’s Period 2 Wholesale Price 
In the last decision stage of the game, the supplier sets the period 2 wholesale price. Table 5 shows the 
equilibrium values for the period 2 wholesale prices, the empirical best responses and the observed 
data.
Table 5: Period 2 Wholesale Prices and Best Responses 
treatment equilibrium
empirical best response observed data
to median to mean median mean value
LC 56 56 58.04 56 58.58
HC 76 76 73.26 76 71.34
We neither observe a significant difference between the empirical best responses and the observed 
prices in the LC treatment (sign test, p = 1.000, two-tailed) nor in the HC treatment (sign test, p = 
0.500, two-tailed). Hence, giving a best response to the inventory choice of the buyer seems to be the 
stable behavior of suppliers in period 2. The fact that the buyers’ inventory choices are strategically 
affecting the wholesale prices of suppliers, as predicted in the analysis by Anand et al. (2008), is 
further supported by a correlation analysis. Calculating Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients 
separately for both treatments, we find that period 2 wholesale prices are significantly and negatively 
correlated to the inventory sizes both in LC (r = -0.748, p < 0.001) and in HC (r = - 0.496, p < 0.001). 
Hence, in both treatments the suppliers take the inventory size of their buyer into account, choosing 
lower period 2 wholesale prices, the more inventory buyer has acquired. 
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Obviously, we find no empirical evidence for boundedly rational behavior based on cognitive 
limitations. It seems that the risk of coordination failure due to cognitive limitations is low in our 
setting, underlining the fact that the hypotheses H1 and H2 receive little support.  
To test for the relevance of the hypotheses H3a and H4a, we need to evaluate the period 2 wholesale 
prices in conjecture with the period 1 wholesale prices. Since we observe period 2 prices that are fully 
in line with the theoretical predictions in both treatments and since the period 1 prices deviate from the 
theoretical predictions only in LC, it is not surprising that we observe average prices in HC that are 
indistinguishable from the theoretical benchmarks (sign test, p = 0.25, two-tailed), while in LC the 
observed average wholesale prices are significantly smaller than the theoretical benchmarks (sign test, 
p = 0.008, two-tailed). Hence, we can conclude that there is no evidence for H3a (“Fairness Concern 
in HC”), but clear evidence for H4a (“Fairness Concern in LC”). 
There are two important observations to notice here. First, we only find an effect of fairness concerns 
in LC, but not in HC. In LC, the buyer has the possibility to reduce the supplier’s payoff at a low cost 
in the empirically relevant range. It seems that only when the buyer is empowered to reduce the 
supplier’s payoff, the supplier displays behavior driven by fairness considerations. Second, note that 
while average wholesale prices in LC are well below the static and the dynamic equilibrium levels, the 
entire price reduction is realized in period 1. This seems to indicate that the supplier prefers to display 
his “fair” behavior before the buyer takes an action, which can be related to the supplier’s perception 
of the buyer’s empowerment. 
5.4 Supply Chain Performance and the Distribution of Payoffs 
Table 6 shows an overview of the equilibrium and observed payoffs in both treatments. We find no 
difference between equilibrium and observed profits in HC. In LC, however, we find that suppliers 
have lower payoffs and that buyers have significantly higher payoffs than in equilibrium (sign test, 
p = 0.008, two-tailed). On the one hand, this implies less inequality in payoffs than in equilibrium. On 
the other hand, since the observed positive payoff difference for buyers is greater than the observed 
negative payoff difference for suppliers, the overall supply chain performance is significantly higher 
than in equilibrium (sign test, p = 0.008, two-tailed). Hence, we can summarize that the behavioral 
effect of strategic inventories on supply chain performance is both efficiency and fairness enhancing. 
Table 6: Comparison of the profits of both treatments 
profits
equilibrium LC HC
LC HC median mean value median mean value
profit supplier
3,024 
(66.55%)
2,888
(66.67%)
2,888
2,870.4
(61.41%)
2,887.75
2,848.13
(64.01%)
profit buyer
1,520 
(33.45%)
1,444
(33.33%)
1,759.25
1,803.6
(38.59%)
1,444
1,533
(34.99%)
profit supply 
chain
4,544 4,332 4,731.5 4,674 4,332 4,381.13
6. Discussion and Implications 
Based on the serial supply chain model by Anand et al. (2008) with 2-periods and price-sensitive 
demand, we present the first experimental test of the effect of strategic inventories on supply chain 
performance. In theory, if wholesale price contracts are used and the holding costs are low enough, 
building up a strategic inventory allows the buyer not only to increase her profit share, but also to 
enhance the overall supply chain performance by inducing a differentiated pricing behavior by the 
supplier. Verifying the predicted effects of strategic inventories in the field is extremely difficult, 
because supply chain interaction is generally embedded in a complex relationship that is 
simultaneously affected by numerous stochastic and strategic variables. The multiple confounds (i.e. 
parallel causal relationships) make the separation and identification of the effects of strategic 
inventories on prices and performance almost impossible in field data. 
Using carefully devised controls and variations in our experiment, we can filter out all other causes 
and effects and, thus, observe the pure effect of strategic inventories. We observe a positive effect of 
strategic inventories on supply chain performance that qualitatively is perfectly in line with the 
theoretical results and that quantitatively goes even beyond the equilibrium prediction. In the case, in 
which the holding cost are prohibitively high (HC treatment), we observe no strategic inventories as 
predicted theoretically. Supply chain performance in this setting is neither enhanced nor impaired by 
the possibility to build up inventories. In the case, in which the holding cost is sufficiently low (LC 
treatment), we observe an extensive adoption of strategic inventories, leading to a strong enhancement 
of supply chain performance. In fact, the observed supply chain performance is even superior to the 
game theoretically expected enhancement. 
Analyzing the behavioral mechanisms that lead to the enhancement of supply chain performance, we 
find little support for the impact of cognitive coordination risk on supply chain behavior. Even though 
the subjects are dealing with a complex interaction situation, we find no clear evidence that buyers or 
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suppliers are strategically hedging against the possibility of stochastic or boundedly rational behavior 
of the other party. Instead, we find strong support for fairness considerations influencing the supply 
chain behavior, but only in the low cost treatment. The striking difference in behavior across 
treatments is due to buyer empowerment, i.e. due to the fact that low cost buyers have a range of 
feasible inequality-reducing inventory choice alternatives that high cost buyers do not have. Buyer 
empowerment in the low cost setting has two consequences. First, low cost buyers frequently choose 
inventory sizes that are not payoff maximizing, but reduce the payoff inequality within the supply 
chain, because they harm the supplier more than they harm the buyer. Second, instead of simply 
choosing a best response to the fairness seeking behavior of the buyers, sellers tend to contribute even 
more to the reduction of the payoff inequality by choosing low first period prices. 
The seller’s willingness to reduce inequality, however, has clear limits. While many suppliers are 
willing to contribute the part of their payoffs exceeding the payoff that they would have achieved in 
the static solution (i.e. without a strategic inventory), we hardly observe any suppliers, who are willing 
to share their payoffs beyond this point. Hence, it seems that payoff in the static solution is a decisive 
benchmark, a focal point, for the suppliers’ fairness concerns. A simple explanation why the static 
solution may be a natural focal point of the game is that it is the best outcome that can be enforced by 
suppliers (i.e. it is the maximin outcome). In fact, the existence of this focal point also explains why 
we see almost no sharing by the sellers in the high cost treatment. The highest achievable payoff for 
suppliers in that treatment is equal to the payoff in the static solution, i.e. at the level of the focal point. 
Securing payoffs at the focal point level, obviously, leaves no financial leeway for other-regarding 
behavior in the high cost treatment. 
Our findings have several implications for supply chain management. First, our findings suggest that 
when holding costs are reasonably low, inventories may (at least partially) be adopted for strategic 
reasons, both enhancing the supply chain performance and empowering the buyer. In other words, our 
results give strong empirical support to the theoretical findings of Anand et al (2008). Second, our 
results suggest that there may be behavioral effects that top off the purely strategic effect. Seeking a 
more equitable payoff distribution in the supply chain, the empowered buyers may harm the supply 
chain performance by choosing suboptimal small inventories. But, this negative effect of buyer 
empowerment on supply chain performance is generally offset by the positive effect of the low first 
period prices that sellers choose in response. Third, our results highlight that the positive effects of fair 
behavior in supply chains can only be achieved with some flexibility concerning the distribution of 
profits. We find that the extent of profit sharing may strongly depend on focal points that emerge from 
the interaction situation and induce upper bounds for the willingness to share. Obviously, such focal 
points may be based on historical, legal, or cultural details of the interaction environment. Our study 
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shows that they may also be based on strategic features of the interaction (e.g. a maximin outside 
option). 
Finally, our results also have some implications for future research, emphasizing that the role of 
strategic inventories should be considered both in non-cooperative supply chain modeling and in 
behavioral research. One important open issue is the design of dynamic contracts that can be used to 
implement the optimal supply chain performance in the presence of strategic inventories. It would be 
important to examine, whether the optimal contract is strategically feasible and behaviorally robust. In 
addition, the role of information asymmetries, especially regarding the inventory size, should be 
further investigated in a setting with strategic inventories. It is not yet clear how the supplier can set 
optimal wholesale prices without the exact knowledge of the inventory size. More complex contracts, 
such as screening contracts, may be necessary to successfully deal with these information asymmetries. 
But, if the complexity of the contracts goes up too much, it may be more effective to rely on less 
sophisticated contractual agreements that take truth-telling and trust into account (see e.g. Charness 
and Dufwenberg, 2011; Inderfurth et al., 2012). 
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Appendix
Appendix A:
Instructions
Please read the instructions carefully and raise your hand, if you have a question. 
In the experiment, in which you participate now, you can earn lab dollars (LD) that will be converted 
into money and paid at you at the end of the experiment. The amount of LD you will earn in each of 
the decision rounds depends both on your decisions and the decisions of your co-player. Every 
decision you make in the experiment is anonymous. 
Background:
You are in a vertical supply chain consisting of one supplier and one buyer. At the beginning of the 
game you will be assigned either the role of the supplier or the buyer. This allocation will be 
maintained in all 15 rounds of the experiment. At the beginning of each round you will be randomly 
assigned to one player with the other role. Each round is divided into five stages (see figure): 
1.stage:supplierdetermines
thewholesalepriceofperiod1
2.stage:buyerdetermines
hisinventorysize
4.stage:supplierdetermines
thewholesalepriceofperiod2
2.stage:buyerterminates
thegame
3.stage:automatedselling:
buyersellstheoptimal
quantitytohiscustomers
5.stage:automatedselling:
buyersellstheoptimal
quantitytohiscustomers

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Stage 1: Decision of the Supplier in Period 1
In the first decision stage of the experiment, the supplier sets the wholesale price at which the buyer 
may purchase goods in the first period. For the wholesale price each value in the interval from 0 to 152 
with a maximum precision of three digits after the decimal point is allowed. In the attached payout 
table the wholesale price of the first period is displayed on the left side of each table. However, the 
table does not include all feasible prices but only the 0 and the numbers in the interval between 52 and 
84 in steps of four. Thus, the payout table serves only as guidance. For the non-displayed prices a 
provided profit calculator can be used. 
wholesale
price
period 1
0
52
56
…
84
Stage 2: Decision of the Buyer in Period 1
At the beginning of the second stage in the period one the buyer is informed about the current 
wholesale price. Then, the buyer can decide whether he continues or terminates the game. If the buyer 
terminates the game, the round ends immediately. If the buyer instead continues the game, he decides 
about his inventory size. Here, each value in the interval between 0 and 38 with a maximum precision 
of three digits after the decimal point is allowed. 
For each unit purchased to build up inventory the wholesale price of the first period needs to be paid to 
the supplier. Additional, holding costs of 4 LD per item are caused. In the attached payout table the 
inventory size is displayed in the upper left corner. Again, not all possible inventory sizes but only 
those in the interval between 0 and 20 in steps of five are given. For other values the provided 
calculator can be used, to obtain the corresponding profits. 
wholesale
price
period 1
0
52
56
…
84
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Stage 3: Automated Vending of the Buyer in Period 1
If the game was not terminated, an automated vending for the first period is operated after the buyer 
has decided about his inventory size. In this stage, the program calculates the optimal selling quantity 
of the buyer and sells them on the market. The optimal selling quantity only depends on the wholesale 
price of the first period, but not on the inventory size of the buyer. 
Stage 4: Decision supplier in period 2
If the game was not terminated, the buyer’s inventory size will be communicated to the supplier and 
the supplier is prompted to set the wholesale price of the second period. For the wholesale price each 
value in the interval from 0 to 152 with a maximum precision of three digits after the decimal point is 
allowed. In the payout table the price of the second period is displayed in the columns (top edge). 
Again, only the 0 and the values in the interval between 52 and 84 are given in steps of four. For 
further calculations the provided calculator can be used. 
inventory wholesale price period 2
0 52 56 … 84
wholesale
price
period 1
0
52
56
…
84
Stage 5: Automated Vending of the Buyer in Period 2
If the game was not terminated, again an automated vending for the second period will be conducted, 
after the supplier has set the wholesale price of the second period. Again, the exact amount that 
maximizes the profit of the buyer will be sold. If the buyer built up inventory in the first period, he can 
use these goods for the vending process and needs to buy fewer units from the buyer in the second 
period. Thus, the optimal selling quantity of the second period depends on both the wholesale price of 
the second period and the inventory size of the buyer. It should be noted that the buyer will not 
purchase further goods from the supplier in the second period, if the wholesale price of the second 
period is too high. In this case, the buyer would only sell his inventory to the external market. 
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Calculation of the Profits of each Round:
After all decisions have been made, the profits of current round for both the supplier and the buyer 
will be displayed. If the trade was rejected, the profit would be zero LD for both players. In all other 
cases, the respective profits for the specified values of the wholesale prices and the inventory size 
correspond to the profits given by the payout table or the calculator. 
Control Question:
The wholesale price of the first period is 72 LD, the inventory size is 15 and the wholesale price of the 
second period is 60 LD. What are the profits for the supplier and the buyer for this round? Please use 
the payout table and write down your answers on the prepared paper. Please wait until we have 
checked your responses. A correct answering of this control question is required to participate in the 
experiment. 
How will the payment be carried out?
Your payment (in Euros) matches the sum of your LD divided by 3000. This means that 30 LD 
correspond to exactly 1 euro cent. You will be paid at the end of the experiment. Please wait until we 
call your name. 
Good luck. 
Profit Table Supplier:
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 1.300 1.344 1.380 1.408 1.428 1.440 1.444 1.440 1.428
52 1.300 2.600 2.644 2.680 2.708 2.728 2.740 2.744 2.740 2.728
56 1.344 2.644 2.688 2.724 2.752 2.772 2.784 2.788 2.784 2.772
60 1.380 2.680 2.724 2.760 2.788 2.808 2.820 2.824 2.820 2.808
64 1.408 2.708 2.752 2.788 2.816 2.836 2.848 2.852 2.848 2.836
68 1.428 2.728 2.772 2.808 2.836 2.856 2.868 2.872 2.868 2.856
72 1.440 2.740 2.784 2.820 2.848 2.868 2.880 2.884 2.880 2.868
76 1.444 2.744 2.788 2.824 2.852 2.872 2.884 2.888 2.884 2.872
80 1.440 2.740 2.784 2.820 2.848 2.868 2.880 2.884 2.880 2.868
84 1.428 2.728 2.772 2.808 2.836 2.856 2.868 2.872 2.868 2.856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 1.040 1.064 1.080 1.088 1.088 1.080 1.064 1.040 1.008
52 1.560 2.600 2.624 2.640 2.648 2.648 2.640 2.624 2.600 2.568
56 1.624 2.664 2.688 2.704 2.712 2.712 2.704 2.688 2.664 2.632
60 1.680 2.720 2.744 2.760 2.768 2.768 2.760 2.744 2.720 2.688
64 1.728 2.768 2.792 2.808 2.816 2.816 2.808 2.792 2.768 2.736
68 1.768 2.808 2.832 2.848 2.856 2.856 2.848 2.832 2.808 2.776
72 1.800 2.840 2.864 2.880 2.888 2.888 2.880 2.864 2.840 2.808
76 1.824 2.864 2.888 2.904 2.912 2.912 2.904 2.888 2.864 2.832
80 1.840 2.880 2.904 2.920 2.928 2.928 2.920 2.904 2.880 2.848
84 1.848 2.888 2.912 2.928 2.936 2.936 2.928 2.912 2.888 2.856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 780 784 780 768 748 720 684 640 588
52 1.820 2.600 2.604 2.600 2.588 2.568 2.540 2.504 2.460 2.408
56 1.904 2.684 2.688 2.684 2.672 2.652 2.624 2.588 2.544 2.492
60 1.980 2.760 2.764 2.760 2.748 2.728 2.700 2.664 2.620 2.568
64 2.048 2.828 2.832 2.828 2.816 2.796 2.768 2.732 2.688 2.636
68 2.108 2.888 2.892 2.888 2.876 2.856 2.828 2.792 2.748 2.696
72 2.160 2.940 2.944 2.940 2.928 2.908 2.880 2.844 2.800 2.748
76 2.204 2.984 2.988 2.984 2.972 2.952 2.924 2.888 2.844 2.792
80 2.240 3.020 3.024 3.020 3.008 2.988 2.960 2.924 2.880 2.828
84 2.268 3.048 3.052 3.048 3.036 3.016 2.988 2.952 2.908 2.856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 520 504 480 448 408 360 304 240 168
52 2.080 2.600 2.584 2.560 2.528 2.488 2.440 2.384 2.320 2.248
56 2.184 2.704 2.688 2.664 2.632 2.592 2.544 2.488 2.424 2.352
60 2.280 2.800 2.784 2.760 2.728 2.688 2.640 2.584 2.520 2.448
64 2.368 2.888 2.872 2.848 2.816 2.776 2.728 2.672 2.608 2.536
68 2.448 2.968 2.952 2.928 2.896 2.856 2.808 2.752 2.688 2.616
72 2.520 3.040 3.024 3.000 2.968 2.928 2.880 2.824 2.760 2.688
76 2.584 3.104 3.088 3.064 3.032 2.992 2.944 2.888 2.824 2.752
80 2.640 3.160 3.144 3.120 3.088 3.048 3.000 2.944 2.880 2.808
84 2.688 3.208 3.192 3.168 3.136 3.096 3.048 2.992 2.928 2.856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 260 224 180 128 68 0 0 0 0
52 2.340 2.600 2.564 2.520 2.468 2.408 2.340 2.340 2.340 2.340
56 2.464 2.724 2.688 2.644 2.592 2.532 2.464 2.464 2.464 2.464
60 2.580 2.840 2.804 2.760 2.708 2.648 2.580 2.580 2.580 2.580
64 2.688 2.948 2.912 2.868 2.816 2.756 2.688 2.688 2.688 2.688
68 2.788 3.048 3.012 2.968 2.916 2.856 2.788 2.788 2.788 2.788
72 2.880 3.140 3.104 3.060 3.008 2.948 2.880 2.880 2.880 2.880
76 2.964 3.224 3.188 3.144 3.092 3.032 2.964 2.964 2.964 2.964
80 3.040 3.300 3.264 3.220 3.168 3.108 3.040 3.040 3.040 3.040
84 3.108 3.368 3.332 3.288 3.236 3.176 3.108 3.108 3.108 3.108
Wholesale 
Price Period 
1
Inventory
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price Period 
1
Wholesale 
Price Period 
1
Inventory
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price Period 
1
Inventory
Wholesale Price Period 2
10
15
20
Inventory
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price Period 
1
Inventory
Wholesale Price Period 2
0
5
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Profit Table Buyer:
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 5.776 4.138 4.040 3.946 3.856 3.770 3.688 3.610 3.536 3.466
52 4.138 2.500 2.402 2.308 2.218 2.132 2.050 1.972 1.898 1.828
56 4.040 2.402 2.304 2.210 2.120 2.034 1.952 1.874 1.800 1.730
60 3.946 2.308 2.210 2.116 2.026 1.940 1.858 1.780 1.706 1.636
64 3.856 2.218 2.120 2.026 1.936 1.850 1.768 1.690 1.616 1.546
68 3.770 2.132 2.034 1.940 1.850 1.764 1.682 1.604 1.530 1.460
72 3.688 2.050 1.952 1.858 1.768 1.682 1.600 1.522 1.448 1.378
76 3.610 1.972 1.874 1.780 1.690 1.604 1.522 1.444 1.370 1.300
80 3.536 1.898 1.800 1.706 1.616 1.530 1.448 1.370 1.296 1.226
84 3.466 1.828 1.730 1.636 1.546 1.460 1.378 1.300 1.226 1.156
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 5.756 4.378 4.300 4.226 4.156 4.090 4.028 3.970 3.916 3.866
52 3.858 2.480 2.402 2.328 2.258 2.192 2.130 2.072 2.018 1.968
56 3.740 2.362 2.284 2.210 2.140 2.074 2.012 1.954 1.900 1.850
60 3.626 2.248 2.170 2.096 2.026 1.960 1.898 1.840 1.786 1.736
64 3.516 2.138 2.060 1.986 1.916 1.850 1.788 1.730 1.676 1.626
68 3.410 2.032 1.954 1.880 1.810 1.744 1.682 1.624 1.570 1.520
72 3.308 1.930 1.852 1.778 1.708 1.642 1.580 1.522 1.468 1.418
76 3.210 1.832 1.754 1.680 1.610 1.544 1.482 1.424 1.370 1.320
80 3.116 1.738 1.660 1.586 1.516 1.450 1.388 1.330 1.276 1.226
84 3.026 1.648 1.570 1.496 1.426 1.360 1.298 1.240 1.186 1.136
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 5.736 4.618 4.560 4.506 4.456 4.410 4.368 4.330 4.296 4.266
52 3.578 2.460 2.402 2.348 2.298 2.252 2.210 2.172 2.138 2.108
56 3.440 2.322 2.264 2.210 2.160 2.114 2.072 2.034 2.000 1.970
60 3.306 2.188 2.130 2.076 2.026 1.980 1.938 1.900 1.866 1.836
64 3.176 2.058 2.000 1.946 1.896 1.850 1.808 1.770 1.736 1.706
68 3.050 1.932 1.874 1.820 1.770 1.724 1.682 1.644 1.610 1.580
72 2.928 1.810 1.752 1.698 1.648 1.602 1.560 1.522 1.488 1.458
76 2.810 1.692 1.634 1.580 1.530 1.484 1.442 1.404 1.370 1.340
80 2.696 1.578 1.520 1.466 1.416 1.370 1.328 1.290 1.256 1.226
84 2.586 1.468 1.410 1.356 1.306 1.260 1.218 1.180 1.146 1.116
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 5.716 4.858 4.820 4.786 4.756 4.730 4.708 4.690 4.676 4.666
52 3.298 2.440 2.402 2.368 2.338 2.312 2.290 2.272 2.258 2.248
56 3.140 2.282 2.244 2.210 2.180 2.154 2.132 2.114 2.100 2.090
60 2.986 2.128 2.090 2.056 2.026 2.000 1.978 1.960 1.946 1.936
64 2.836 1.978 1.940 1.906 1.876 1.850 1.828 1.810 1.796 1.786
68 2.690 1.832 1.794 1.760 1.730 1.704 1.682 1.664 1.650 1.640
72 2.548 1.690 1.652 1.618 1.588 1.562 1.540 1.522 1.508 1.498
76 2.410 1.552 1.514 1.480 1.450 1.424 1.402 1.384 1.370 1.360
80 2.276 1.418 1.380 1.346 1.316 1.290 1.268 1.250 1.236 1.226
84 2.146 1.288 1.250 1.216 1.186 1.160 1.138 1.120 1.106 1.096
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 5.696 5.098 5.080 5.066 5.056 5.050 5.048 5.048 5.048 5.048
52 3.018 2.420 2.402 2.388 2.378 2.372 2.370 2.370 2.370 2.370
56 2.840 2.242 2.224 2.210 2.200 2.194 2.192 2.192 2.192 2.192
60 2.666 2.068 2.050 2.036 2.026 2.020 2.018 2.018 2.018 2.018
64 2.496 1.898 1.880 1.866 1.856 1.850 1.848 1.848 1.848 1.848
68 2.330 1.732 1.714 1.700 1.690 1.684 1.682 1.682 1.682 1.682
72 2.168 1.570 1.552 1.538 1.528 1.522 1.520 1.520 1.520 1.520
76 2.010 1.412 1.394 1.380 1.370 1.364 1.362 1.362 1.362 1.362
80 1.856 1.258 1.240 1.226 1.216 1.210 1.208 1.208 1.208 1.208
84 1.706 1.108 1.090 1.076 1.066 1.060 1.058 1.058 1.058 1.058
Wholesale
Price Period 
1
Inventory 20
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale
Price Period 
1
Inventory 15
Wholesale Price Period 2
Inventory 0
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale
Price Period 
1
Inventory 5
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale
Price Period 
1
Inventory 10
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale
Price Period 
1
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Appendix B:
Fairness inventory size: 
The buyer can use strategic inventory to reduce the absolute difference in profit between herself and 
the supplier. The fairness inventory size that minimizes the profit difference is obtained by a 
comparison of the marginal profit of the supplier and the buyer with respect to the inventory size. 
The marginal profit of the buyer can be obtained by calculating the first derivative of the buyer’s profit 
function with respect to the inventory size. Under consideration of the automated determination of the 
selling quantities in both periods (see (6) and (4)) and under the assumption that the supplier will 
choose the optimal response wholesale price from (5) in the second period5, according to (2) the 
relevant profit function of the buyer is: 
 2 21 1 15 8 4 12 16 12
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Therefore, the derivation of the buyer’s profit function (10) is: 
 
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Hence, in the LC treatment (i.e., for 4h  ), the buyer should only build up inventory if  1 110w 
 .
Further, we see that the advantage of building up inventory is larger, the lower w . Therefore, by 
setting a low wholesale price in the first period, the supplier can influence the incentive of the buyer 
for building up inventory. This becomes visible from the optimality condition (setting the marginal 
profit in 
1
(11) equal to zero) so that the buyer’s profit maximizing inventory decision is derived as 
. Further, the marginal profit of the inventory is diminishing. 1 1B ( ) (114 ) / 3I w w h  
The influence of inventory on the supplier’s profit can be obtained similarly. Because of the 
automation of the buyer’s selling quantities, the optimal response quantities again need to be inserted 
into the profit function (1) of the supplier. Under the assumption that the supplier will choose the 
optimal response wholesale price in the second period, the relevant profit function of the supplier is: 
5 The analysis of the observed wholesale price decision of the supplier shows that this assumption is fulfilled. 
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Therefore, the derivation of the supplier’s profit function (12) is: 
1
1
2
76 2 .
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 (13) 
If the buyer aims to minimize the profit difference by using strategic inventory, she should only lower 
her inventory size, if her marginal disadvantage of this action is lower than the corresponding marginal 
disadvantage of the supplier. The inventory size, for which the marginal profits from (11) and (13) are 
equal, therefore, is: 
1
1
2 1
5 5
5 8 4
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 (14) 
As inventory size smaller than zero are not possible, the fairness inventory size is given by: 
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